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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
PRACTICE-DEPENDENT POLITICAL THEORY  
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION 
 
 
It is often claimed that in normative political theory political imagination should 
remain unaffected by real-world contingencies: our idea of how the world “ought 
to be” should be independent from how the world “actually is”. According to the 
practice-dependent thesis, instead, “[t]he content, scope, and justification of a 
conception of justice depends on the structure and form of the practices that the 
conception is intended to govern” (Sangiovanni 2008). This methodological ap-
proach conceives the relationship between theory and practice as an interplay: nor-
mative theory applies to practice, but practices are also able to affect the content 
of normative theory. In this paper, I argue that the interplay between theory and 
practices that the practice-dependent method generates has not been fully under-
stood. Though it may – at a superficial look – appear as a method compliant with 
the status quo, I will show that this method implies an idea of political theory as 
an activity of continuous critical engagement. Given an extended account of the 
method, political imagination has boundaries but these are not fixed nor easily-
definable: the real-world fact that constrains practice-dependent principles is the 
point and purpose of the practice they are meant to apply to, but this fact in itself 
is partly shaped and critically assessed by the theorist. 
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PRACTICE-DEPENDENT POLITICAL THEORY  
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION 
 
GRETA FAVARA 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
My primary interest in this paper is to clarify the following issue: (a) In normative 
political theory, what conception of political imagination does the practice-
dependent method entail?2 But before engaging directly with this question, I am 
going to spend a few words on each of the key concepts that build it up in order 
to clearly explain what I aim at by discussing it. 
 
Let me begin with the most general concept, that of “normative political theory”. 
Political theory is a complex discipline which can endorse several functions. In this 
paper, I will deal with political theory as specifically intended in a normative sense. 
When political theory sets itself a normative task, its main goal consists in suggest-
ing an answer to the timeless question “What is to be done?”. Indeed, the core 
objective of normative political theory is to define what ought to be pursued in the 
political domain; namely, how we should act, given a corresponding conception of 
what would be desirable to achieve. Hence its “normative” role: normative politi-
cal theory is ultimately concerned with identifying which principles political action 
ought to abide by.3 
 
                                                     
1  I am particularly grateful to Antonella Besussi, Giulia Bistagnino and Francesca 
Pasquali for discussing several parts of this paper. I must also thank all the participants to the 
panel “Questioni di metodo. Tra scienza politica e filosofia politica”, at the Annual Conference 
of the Italian Political Science Association in Cosenza, for providing helpful comments. This 
paper was partly written during a research visit at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and 
Social Science at LSE where I benefited from a supportive and stimulating environment. Any 
further comment on the arguments here presented is very welcome. 
2  Throughout the paper I will use PD instead of “practice-dependent” and PDM instead 
of “practice-dependent method”. 
3  For a useful classification of the different goals political theory can pursue, see List and 
Valentini (2014). 
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Moreover, I am mentioning here a specific “method” used within the discipline. In 
fact, my purpose is to deal with normative political theory endorsing a specific 
point of view: my main interest is indeed methodological. This means that the fo-
cus of the paper lays on how political theories ought to be construed, not tanta-
mount which particular political theories ought to be favoured. 
 
The interest in the methodology of construction of political theories is quite a re-
cent development in the literature. The questions that have dominated the debate 
represent, for the most part, all different interpretations of a single fundamental 
concern; namely, to what extent political theories ought to be sensitive to political reality? 
That is, are brute facts able to affect and constrain the normative principles we 
ought to follow, i.e. our idea of what would be desirable to achieve? 
 
Few (if any) theorists would deny that political reality ought to matter sensibly 
when political theories are to be applied. For, given the features that characterise 
the diverse circumstances of application of normative principles, it will hardly be 
the case that one principle will imply the same action in every context. For in-
stance, implementing a principle of equal opportunity will plausibly imply different 
actions in different contexts: in certain contexts it might require reforms against 
gender inequality, in others it might demand policies against religious discrimina-
tion. However, I want to examine the problem of the relationship between facts 
and principles by dealing with a different approach to the issue. I can, then, intro-
duce the third key concept that appears in (a). In fact, another way in which real-
world facts could affect political theories has also been suggested: more controver-
sially some have argued that facts could affect the justification of normative princi-
ples, not merely their application. According to those who defend a similar meth-
odological approach — which, following the recent literature, can be dubbed the 
“practice-dependent” method — the context of application of normative princi-
ples fundamentally shapes and alters the reasons we might exhibit for adopting 
them. In this sense, the context is not merely the field of application of certain 
principles independently stated; rather, for PD theorists, the context itself contrib-
utes to determine which normative principles would be appropriate to adopt for 
its regulation. 
 
At this point, I can state more clearly my objective by introducing the fourth cru-
cial concept which appears in (a), that of “political imagination”. With political 
imagination I define the set of imaginary worlds political theory could legitimately 
consider an evaluative standard for normative purposes. According to the use I 
make of this concept, political imagination identifies the set of all the possible 
worlds that political theory could consider desirable to achieve and, corresponding-
ly, whose realisation might be demanded of us. Then, rephrasing (a), my main task 
consists in understanding which worlds might be considered as legitimate norma-
tive standards in case the PDM were employed and consistently followed. 
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Now, given the brief characterisation of the PDM I provided above, we know that 
the set of possible worlds that will define the borders of the PD political imagina-
tion will be shaped, in part, by some factual considerations. Indeed, precisely be-
cause the PDM states that the content of political theories (i.e. the normative prin-
ciples it prescribes) ought to be context-sensitive, the set of worlds that such 
method will judge desirable to achieve will be a function of some descriptive in-
formation about the theory's field of application. Hence, by setting up an inquiry 
into the conception of political imagination entailed by the PDM, my purpose is to 
provide a better understanding of how the interaction between facts and principles 
is conceptualised and is supposed to work within the PD methodological frame-
work. 
 
The reason why I judge this question crucial is that I believe some fundamental 
methodological implications of the PDM have so far remained unrecognised, de-
spite the recent attention such method has received. As I will show, these further 
implications, if taken together, display a picture of the interaction between reality 
and theory engendered by the PDM much complex. 
 
It is my conviction that such analysis would prove to be useful especially for two 
categories of recipients: those who profess themselves as PD theorists, and (some 
of) those who are willing to take a critical stance against it. On the one hand, my 
analysis should favour a better implementation of the method itself by specifying 
which tasks a PD theorist ought to fulfil in order to consistently apply the method. 
On the other hand, such a picture should mitigate the worries of those who might 
fear that such method — precisely because starts from existing practices, and does 
not conceptualise desirable worlds from scratch — leads to a collapse of the nor-
mative dimension into the descriptive one, thereby betraying the very task of nor-
mative theory, i.e. providing an authoritative standpoint from which to criticise the 
actual world. For, as I will explain, in the PDM the relationship between theory 
and reality is far from being one of passive acceptance of the status quo. The 
PDM has several resources to actively criticise existing practices, and it must rely 
on all of them in order to abide by its basic methodological commitments. So, 
those who fear an excess of status quo bias might find the analysis that follows 
clarifying. 
 
My discussion, however, will not help to counteract criticisms of a different sort. 
Those who think that normative political theory, as a normative enterprise, ought 
not be in any sense fact-sensitive, will not find my analysis helpful; nor will those 
who feel dissatisfied about the justification PD theorists provide of their method.4 
Criticisms of this sort do not raise complaints about the supposed insufficient dis-
tance that the PDM sets between the actual world and the normative standard as-
sumed, but move against the very methodological commitments which ground 
their method; namely, the link between facts and principles itself, or the specific 
                                                     
4  I am grateful to Vincenzo Maimone for pushing me to clarify this point. 
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PD interpretation of it.5 The point of view which I am here adopting is wholly 
internal to the PD methodological paradigm: I do not assess its foundations, nor 
judge its merit against other available methods; I assume the validity of such 
method with the aim of precisely unfolding its implications, in particular its way of 
construing the relationship between facts and principles. 
 
Now that the meaning and relevance of (a) should be clearer, before engaging with 
its discussion, let me add a final remark essential to understand the analysis that 
follows. I will specifically try to clarify how the PDM conceives the relationship 
between facts and principles through the notion of “model”. I will indeed employ 
the notion of “model” as a conceptual tool throughout the paper. But what is a 
model? Here I borrow a quotation selected by James Johnson in “Models Among 
the Political Theorists”, as it perfectly states the sense in which I will employ the 
concept of “model” throughout the paper. 
“A model can be a precise and economical statement of a set of rela-
tionships that are sufficient to produce the phenomenon in question. 
Or, a model can be an actual biological, mechanical, or social system 
that embodies the relationships in an especially transparent way, pro-
ducing the phenomenon in question as an obvious consequence of 
those relationships. These two meanings of 'model' are not very dif-
ferent” (Schelling 1978, 87, cited in Johnson 2014, 547). 
A model, as I will use the term here, is a representation of a set of relationships 
which, if suitably interpreted, are sufficient to explain a given phenomenon. No-
tice, crucially, that in this definition “relationships” and “phenomenon” could be 
filled by several different entities. Then, if we interpret “phenomenon” as a nor-
mative outcome, models are also those devices which explain how a set of factual 
relationships connects with a set of specific normative principles. Why does such 
notion prove to be useful in the present context? For two reasons mainly. First, 
because I said I am interested in assessing how and to what extent political theo-
ries are shaped by facts within the PDM. As I will explain, the main device 
through which the PDM derives conceptions of justice can be explained as a 
model — as a process through which a set of principles is derived from a set of 
suitably represented facts.6 Second, and more generally, because the notion of 
model proves to be a powerful tool to systematise my methodological analysis. In 
fact, tackling the issue raised through the notion of model helps to easily clarify 
and classify which argumentative strategies the PDM can draw from in order to 
define what normative principles apply to us, as well as to understand in which 
respects the PDM differs from other typical methodological approaches. In other 
                                                     
5  For a critique along these lines see especially Cohen (2003). 
6  Notice that models are not theories. A model does not explain, in itself, why a certain rela-
tionship between inputs and outputs actually holds. It is the theory behind the model which 
defines that certain models are relevant and valid. So, the way in which we come to ascertain 
that a specific relationship between facts and principles does subsist is a matter established by 
the theoretical apparatus that supports the model. On the difference between models and the-
ories see Frigg and Hartmann (2012). 
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words, in the present case, models provide us with an efficient interpretative key 
to understand to what extent the PDM allows theories to depend on real-world 
facts. 
 
For this reason I will conduct my discussion of (a) endorsing a particular key of 
analysis. I will try to answer (a) by providing an answer to: (a*) “in normative po-
litical theory, which models should the practice-dependent method employ in or-
der to appropriately understand what normative principles apply to us?”7  
 
Specifically, making use of the model-jargon throughout the paper, I will argue 
that there are four argumentative strategies that must compose a PD research 
method. Two of those have been extensively discussed by the recent literature. 
The other two have been neglected, though they are direct implications of this 
classic account of the PDM provided by PD theorists. Together, these four strate-
gies give us a complex, and much more detailed, picture of the kind of political 
imagination implied by the PDM. To this aim, I will proceed as follows. In Section 
2, I will introduce the PDM and explain the justificatory method it endorses and 
the model it explicitly employs. In Section 3, I will show that there are other mod-
els the PDM ought to rely on, beyond the standard ones discussed. In my con-
cluding remarks (Section 4) I will deal directly with (a) suggesting how we ought to 
interpret political imagination within a PD framework, in light of the discussion 
conducted through Sections 2 and 3. 
 
2. THE PDM AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE 
STANDARD ACCOUNT 
 
How does the PDM work? In this section I will give a brief outline of such meth-
od with the main intent to clarify which models PD theorists regard legitimate to 
employ in order to justify a political theory. Specifically, my focus will be on PD 
theories of justice. This choice is due to the fact that discussions around the PDM 
have been developed in the context of global justice debates, hence theories of 
justice have been the main focus and I will follow, for simplicity, the terms em-
ployed in those analyses.8 
 
                                                     
7  By discussing (a) and (a*) we should also be able to say something about: (a**) How 
are models employed in normative political theory? In fact, despite the connection between 
models and political theory might look at first glance awkward, models are widely employed in 
political theory, but this fact is rarely acknowledged – a notable exception being Johnson 
(2014). However this second issue is supposed to emerge only indirectly from the analysis of 
the PDM, which is my core concern. Nonetheless, I regard this paper as an attempt to shed 
some light also on (a**). 
8  However, as Robert Jubb (2014) notices, such a connection is not necessary, the PDM 
could be equally employed to justify theories of other political values, such as liberty or legiti-
macy. The PDM just states that when we want to construe a theory for a given political value 
we ought to justify it with reference to current practices. For a practice-dependent analysis of 
legitimation, see Rossi (2012). 
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Although the practice-depended method has come to be known with this name in 
an article written by Aaron James (2005), where he first suggested a fully PD in-
terpretation of John Rawls's methodology, we owe the most systematised account 
of this method to Andrea Sangiovanni's article “Justice and the Priority of Politics 
to Morality” (Sangiovanni 2008). The PDM has then been defended in a series of 
later articles and essays which partly corrected or refined Sangiovanni's work;9 
however, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality” still qualifies as the best 
starting point to illustrate the PD justificatory procedure. 
 
In “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality”, Sangiovanni defines the core 
thesis of the practice-dependence approach as follows: 
“Practice-Dependent Thesis: The content, scope, and justification of a 
conception of justice depends on the structure and form of the prac-
tices that the conception is intended to govern” (Sangiovanni 2008, 
138). 
Where with “practice” Sangiovanni means, following a definition originally pro-
posed by Rawls, “any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines 
offices, roles, moves, penalties, defences, and so on, and which gives the activity 
its structure” (Rawls et al. 1999, 20). 
 
Then, as Sangiovanni's Thesis clearly states, for PD theorists there is a fundamental 
connection between political reality and conceptions of justice: according to the 
PDM, the content, scope, and justification of conceptions of justice depends on 
the practices which the conception is meant to apply to. So, how a PD theorist 
will end up defining which states of affairs ought to be pursued strictly depends on 
which kind of connection is supposed to hold between practices and principles. 
But how does a PD theorist conceive the construction of justice from existing 
practices? 
 
According to Sangiovanni — who follows, in this respect, Dworkin's idea of con-
structive interpretation (Dworkin 1986) — a PD normative justification must be struc-
tured around three steps: the pre-interpretive step, the interpretive step, and the post-
interpretive step. These three steps allow the PD theorist to move from the descrip-
tive to the normative by focusing on specific features of the practices we currently 
inhabit. So it is crucial to illustrate them clearly. The first step, the pre-interpretive, 
is meant to specify which practice constitutes the object of our normative analysis. 
In this first stage, for the interpretation to be a workable starting point, it ought to 
be supported by a sufficient degree of consensus. Following the definition men-
tioned above, examples of practices that might fall under our attention could be 
— just to mention some — the family, the basic structure of society, or the inter-
national law for humanitarian aids. The first step, then, is meant to be merely de-
scriptive. It is the second step that turns the argument into a normative justifica-
                                                     
9 See Banai, Schemmel, and Ronzoni (2011), James (2012; 2014), Ronzoni (2009; 2012), 
Rossi (2012), and Valentini (2011). 
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tion. The interpretive step is — as the name suggests — devoted to uncovering 
what is the normative purpose of the practice identified in the first step. Here, the 
interpreter should ask herself what is the point and purpose of the practice under 
exam, namely what are the values it is meant to foster. In order to reach a sound 
interpretation, the interpreter ought to understand both what are the reasons that 
push participants to evaluate and comply with that practice, and what are the 
goods the practice actually provides. The objective of this second step, then, is to 
reach a coherent and plausible explanation of what is the social significance of the 
practice under scrutiny. Finally, it is the third step, the post-interpretive, that gen-
erates the principles that ought to govern the practice in question. In the third step 
the conception of justice is construed selecting those principles which, if followed, 
would make possible to fully achieve the point and purpose of the practice, as 
specified by the second step. Namely, the post-interpretive stage defines which 
social conducts best serve the value(s) that practice is meant to foster and, corre-
spondingly, how that practice should be governed, or reformed, to the pursuit of 
that goal (Sangiovanni 2008, 148-52).10 
 
Before saying something about the kind of political imagination that seems to be 
implied by such a method, I want to underline an essential feature of this justifica-
tory procedure: the third step of the justification could be described as relying on a 
specific model. In the introductory section I said that whenever a correspondence 
between facts and principles is established, this could be expressed in the form of 
a model which would allow us to derive normative conclusions from a set of well-
specified factual relationships. This is precisely what seems to happen in the third 
step just illustrated. The third step says that we need to construe principles of jus-
tice as those principles which would grant the full achievement of the point and 
purpose of the examined practice. So how could we assess when this condition is 
fulfilled? In order to conclude that some principles do indeed grant that the prac-
tice in question correctly follows its purpose, we could efficaciously refer to a 
model. More specifically, we could start from a representation of a practice which 
effectively abides by the point and purpose identified by the interpretive step. 
Then, by looking at this imaginary structure, we could understand which dynamics 
would govern it. From this particular perspective we would, therefore, easily figure 
out the appropriate conception of justice for existing practices: what justice de-
mands of us would be given by the meaning and function justice would assume 
within that appropriately designed practice in order to grant its correct function-
ing. This seems precisely the kind of reasoning which is required by the third in-
terpretive step. In order to easily identify it, I want to dub this PD model as the 
“idealised model”.11 The model, indeed, depicts what would constitute the “ideal” 
                                                     
10  This three-step procedure is also extensively explained in James (2005, 298-308). 
11  This definition does not refer in any sense to the technical notion of idealisation as op-
posed to abstraction which is proposed by Onora O'Neill in Towards Justice and Virtue, see 
O'Neill (1996). 
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form actual practices would take if they had to fully realise their normative pur-
pose. 
 
Let us now turn to the issue of political imagination. As we have seen, the justifi-
catory procedure the PD approach sets up creates an essential connection between 
conception of justice and point and purpose of the practice it is meant to govern. 
The scope of states of affairs that a PD theory would judge as desirable to pursue 
is then quite limited: only those worlds which instantiate the normative purpose of 
already existing practices fall within the set of political circumstances we could 
imagine as worthwhile to achieve. 
 
Seen in this light, the limits of political imagination for a PD theorist may result 
particularly narrow. In fact, it is easy to accuse the PDM of being founded on a 
status quo bias which severely undermines its normative enterprise. If our idea of 
what ought to be done is strictly dependent upon the point and purpose of already 
existing practices, it seems that justice would lack one of its fundamental func-
tions: the ability to criticise, and possibly radically revise, the arrangements we 
happen to live in. The PDM seems indeed to passively convert empirical facts into 
truths about justice, thereby preventing a critical revision of actual practices and 
tacitly accepting the status quo.12  
 
But to what extent is this status quo bias charge warranted? In order to appropri-
ately assess to what degree, in the PD framework, political imagination is con-
strained and affected by political reality, we need to carefully understand what the-
oretical resources PDA might draw from in order criticise actual practices. This is 
what I will try to clarify in the remaining part of this paper. 
 
To this end, I will proceed in two stages. Firstly, in the remaining part of the pre-
sent section I will specify which methods of inquiry the PDM fundamentally op-
poses, and I will conclude with some preliminary remarks about the status quo 
bias. In the section that follows, instead, I will turn to an analysis of the additional 
theoretical tools the PDM ought to employ in order to make possible a criticism 
of existing practices. Only then, we will have a better idea of how a PD theorist 
could interpret and answer the status quo bias charge. 
 
2.1. The PDM and the flaws of theory 
 
So, as I said, let us first of all see which methods of inquiry the PDM fundamen-
tally opposes. There are two basic methodological claims that seem to follow from 
the constructive interpretation PD theorists propose: i) Adequate principles of 
justice cannot descend from justificatory systems which do not employ models; ii) 
Adequate principles of justice cannot descend from justificatory systems which 
employ irrelevant fictional models. Both i) and ii) refer to classical justificatory 
                                                     
12  Jubb and Banai raise and discuss at length the same possible worry. 
Greta Favara • Practice-dependent Political Theory and the Boundaries of Political Imagination           
13 
 
 
strategies in political theory; however, they constitute theoretical resources una-
vailable to the PDM. Let me explain them in turn. 
 
i) Against justificatory systems without models 
To begin with what is probably the most obvious observation, the PDM rejects 
justificatory strategies which proceed deducing principles of justice directly from a 
set of more fundamental moral principles. As Sangiovanni explains, in purely de-
ductive systems principles of justice are “justified by appealing solely to moral val-
ues or to facts about human beings as such” (Sangiovanni 2008, 139-40). In similar 
systems, then, the context of application of a theory does not matter for the justi-
fication of principles of justice. As the conception of justice is entirely deduced 
from a set of moral premises, the context of application gains importance only 
when the conception of justice has been fully understood and has to be imple-
mented. 
 
A typical example of a purely deductive justificatory procedure might run as fol-
lows: starting from the basic principle that every individual ought to be treated as 
morally equal, we could argue that any inequality that is due to brute luck ought to 
be repaired as fundamentally unfair; in addition, given the fact that the place of 
birth is certainly a matter of luck, we could argue that the scope of principles of 
distributive justice ought to be global, then concluding that we ought to follow a 
global egalitarian conception of justice. In this sketchy reasoning — which is typi-
cal, for instance, of different versions of global egalitarianism13 — no reference is 
made to existing practices for the justification of principles: principles descend 
from the equal moral worth of individuals coupled with the recognition that the 
place of birth is arbitrary, and practices matter when we need to understand how 
to implement justice. Then, the essential structure of purely deductive justifica-
tions could be expressed by a sequence (P0...Pn) → PJ; namely, from a set of prin-
ciples and their implications a full conception of justice is derived. 
 
Purely deductive systems, therefore, would evaluate current practices by, first, fig-
uring out what its conception of justice would entail in practice and, second, com-
paring those fully just circumstances to our actual ones. Such a strategy is much 
common in political theory, but it is unavailable to PD theorists. As we have seen, 
for a PD theorist a conception of justice does not follow from a set of moral prin-
ciples. As conceptions of justice must be drawn from the point and purpose of 
actual practices, the only world it can meaningfully compare to ours, from the 
point of view of justice, is the one instantiating practices which fully abide by the 
point and purpose of existing ones. 
 
ii) Against justificatory systems which make use of (non-idealised) fictional models 
An alternative classic approach to the purely deductive process we have just seen 
is represented by those justificatory structures which do employ models in order 
                                                     
13  See Caney (2005) and Tan (2004).  
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to derive conceptions of justice — as the PDM does — but in which the models 
taken into account are not idealisations of the practice according to its point and 
purpose. 
 
The use of models is indeed much common in political theory, it is not a unique 
feature of PD approaches. Moreover, the models which are employed in political 
theory all share a common structure and a common purpose. However, they can 
considerably vary with respect to the circumstances they depict: and this is where 
the problem for PD theorists lies. Therefore, we need to understand which models 
— despite sharing a common structure and purpose with the idealised model — 
PD theorists would not find acceptable; namely, which theoretical tools they are 
prevented to employ in normative theory. 
 
I want to call the models generally employed by political theorists as “fictional 
models”, where the idealised PD model above-illustrated represents a specific kind 
of model which falls within this broad category. A fictional model, as I am going 
to use the term here, is a model that is built upon unrealistic representations; where, 
with “unrealistic representation”, I refer to a wide variety of cases having in com-
mon the feature of depicting circumstances which are not (though they might be) 
met in reality. To give an idea of the variety of models I am referring to, the fol-
lowing are all instances of fictional models: models representing reality in a much 
simplified way, models adding unrealistic features to realistic descriptions, or mod-
els depicting fully artificial circumstances. 
 
Partly, we have already seen how fictional models can be helpful in normative rea-
soning. The model PD employs is fictional because it depicts an artificial situation 
in which the point and purpose of current practices is fully realised. Such unrealis-
tic situation proved to be essential within the PD justificatory method, because it 
allowed the PD theorist to clearly see what justice would require of us if we had to 
fully comply with the point and purpose of existing practices. Then, the fictional 
model in the PD approach plays a fundamental role of conceptual clarification: it 
allows us to see what we are unable to see while we are embedded in the complex-
ity of real-world scenarios. By modelling imaginary circumstances in an appropri-
ate way, the requirements of justice emerge easily and vividly. In fact, this is the 
way in which models are used in political theory more generally. The main scope 
of fictional models is typically the one of clarifying our intuitions by setting up 
appropriate circumstances against which we ought to assess them: the artificial 
cases employed are meant to allow the exclusion of interfering factors or biased 
judgements, thereby shedding light on the subject at stake.14  
 
Once again, to make my case more vivid, let us consider one of the many forms a 
model may assume in political theory. Among all the models used in political theo-
ry that could be recalled, the Original Position John Rawls introduces in A Theory 
                                                     
14  On this point see Stemplowska (2008) and Valentini (2009). 
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of Justice is surely the one worth recalling (Rawls 1971).15 The Original Position de-
scribes an artificial situation in which a group of individuals is imagined as engaged 
in a discussion about what principles of justice ought to govern their society. By 
figuring out what they would choose in that situation, Rawls argues, we would bet-
ter understand what principles of justice do indeed apply to us. How this can hap-
pen? The Original Position is meant to provide a better understanding of justice 
because the situation represented there is tailored in such a way as to avoid the 
interference of contingent factors and to simplify the evaluation: the participants 
are placed behind a “veil of ignorance” which puts them in a condition to ignore 
which social position they will end up occupying in real circumstances, and they 
are provided with a list of conceptions of justice among which they might choose 
from. Reflecting from such a peculiar perspective, according to Rawls, allow us to 
gain a much brighter vision upon justice and its requirements precisely because we 
bracket the contingencies that would otherwise obfuscate our understanding. In 
fact, the introduction of the veil of ignorance assures that other factors such as 
economic status, social position or balances of power, do not affect judgements 
about justice, and the choice of providing the participants with a list of concep-
tions of justice assures that the representative device is able to explain how the 
discussion would be conducted.16 
 
In what relation does the PD approach stand with respect to justificatory struc-
tures which make use of fictional models like the Original Position? As in the case 
of justificatory structures which do not employ models, it seems that the PD ap-
proach cannot avail itself of fictional models other than the idealised one PD the-
orists necessitate in order to accomplish the third step of the constructive interpre-
tation. Indeed, in a PD perspective, there would be no point in assessing our intui-
tions about requirements of justice starting from fancy representations which bear 
little, or none, resemblance with how our practices actually work. Fictional prac-
tices construed on the basis of criteria which are not the idealisation of the point 
and purpose of actual practices would picture circumstances structured around 
other social meanings and practical purposes. For a PD theorist, who grounds jus-
tice on the social meanings we attribute to actual practices, this would constitute a 
                                                     
15  Another example that could be mentioned is Ronald Dworkin's Shipwreck scenario 
(Dworkin 2000). The Shipwreck scenario is an imaginary setting Dworkin creates in order to 
better understand how distributive justice ought to be conceived. The idea, in its fundamental 
terms, is the following: a group of people, after a shipwreck, find itself in a remote island and 
they have to find a mechanism to distribute the available goods in order not to disappoint any 
member of the group, i.e. not to create disadvantage. Dworkin's idea is that the best way to 
conceive how goods would be distributed among them is to set up a hypothetical auction: eve-
ry participant has an equal number of clamshells they might use to bit to assure themselves the 
goods they value more. Starting from this artificial setting, we are asked to imagine how such 
distribution would end up look like. In this way, Dworkin hopes to better define how an equal 
distribution, which preserves preferences but eliminates the effect of brute luck, ought to be 
arranged.  
16  For a discussion of the Original Position as a model see Johnson (2014). 
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fundamental theoretical error.17 But then, the PDM is also prevented from relying 
on a much common resource which is usually employed to clarify our normative 
commitments.  
 
So, in order to understand what justice requires of us and evaluate actual circum-
stances, the PDM cannot avail itself of classic theoretical tools which are widely 
employed by other approaches. For the PDM it would be pointless to assess pre-
sent circumstances relying on imaginary arrangements other than the ones which 
fully abide by the point and purpose of our practices, be they fully alternative po-
litical worlds or simply fictional models: in the PDM the criterion of desirability is 
defined by the point and purpose of existing practices, other theoretical exercises 
distance ourselves from understanding what justice entails. 
 
2.2. The PDM and the flaws of practice 
 
As I anticipated, I would like to conclude this section by delving more deeply into 
the status quo bias charge. Has the PDM resources to counteract that charge, even 
if it cannot avail itself of argumentative strategies which are typically employed by 
political theorists? There are two major ways which PD theorists can use to sub-
stantively revise actual circumstances and that are commonly pointed out in the 
literature to explain why their method is not a mere reiteration of the status quo. 
In the next section, as I said, I will add two further tools to this list, arguing that 
they must be conceived as implication of the argumentative strategies which are 
already recognised by the literature. By now, let us see the two argumentative 
strategies classically recognised. 
 
The first one consists in strictly following what the interpretive process itself leads 
to. Some indeed may say that those who move the status quo bias charge actually 
fail to appreciate the whole potential of the interpretive procedure.18 In fact, the 
interpretive process is designed as to unfold what objectives a certain practice 
ought to pursue in order to fulfil its purposes. Then, if the interpretive process led 
us to recognise that current arrangements depart from what they would be sup-
posed to deliver, we would be justified — in fact we would have a duty — to re-
                                                     
17  On this point see Ronzoni (2012) in which she criticises Gerald Cohen's argument in 
favour of his two socialist principles of justice raising doubts about his justificatory strategy. In 
Why Not Socialism? Cohen (2009) justifies the two socialist principles setting up an imaginary 
example which would prove the desirability of his conception of justice: the camping trip case. 
According to Cohen, the circumstances of a camping trip help us to understand why the two 
socialist principles would realise a desirable cooperation schema and would be happily en-
dorsed by every participants in that imaginary setting. Ronzoni, arguing from a PD perspective, 
accuses the model employed by Cohen of inappropriateness. As a camping trip is a social prac-
tice which has a point and purpose much different from that of the institutions which govern a 
nation state, the principles that prove to be valid in the first setting cannot be uncritically re-
garded as valid also in the second one. For this reason, the fiction Cohen employs must be 
regarded as an inadequate device of justification. 
18  See Jubb (2014). 
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form them and to rearrange our political conduct accordingly (Sangiovanni 2008, 
159-60). But this is not its only resource. The interpretive process may also lead us 
to demand the creation of new practices. It is indeed perfectly meaningful for a PD 
theorist to argue that existing practices prove to be insufficient to the fulfilment of 
the objectives they are valued for. In similar cases, a simple reform of existing 
structures would be inadequate; we would need, instead, to supplement actual 
practices with new ones.19 And finally, there might even be cases in which, follow-
ing the constructive interpretation, we would need to abolish some existing prac-
tices. This may happen when existing practices clash and cannot be harmonised. 
As Banai, Schemmel and Ronzoni (2011) emphasise, we live in a world of “over-
lapping practices”, and these rarely can coexist harmoniously. So, according to a 
first strand of argument, the status quo bias must be at least reshaped: it is true 
that PD theorist ground justice on the point and purpose of existing practices, but 
this is far from saying that the PDM simply “accepts” actual circumstances as they 
stand. 
 
The second strategy a PD theorist could follow to revise actual circumstances 
emerges from what the interpretive process does not say. We have seen that accord-
ing to the interpretive process conceptions of justice ought to be construed in light 
of the point and purpose of the practice under scrutiny. For this reason, justifica-
tory methods which derive principles of justice from a set of universal moral prin-
ciples (i.e. bracketing practices) are not considered valid: principles of justice must 
be practice-dependent. However, this methodological thesis, in itself, does not 
deny the existence of basic universal moral principles. The PD justificatory pro-
cess only says that from basic moral principles a conception of justice cannot be 
derived; nonetheless, it may still be the case that some basic moral principles ought 
to be recognised as valid. If it so, it could be the case that some basic moral prin-
ciples might still have enough authority to set negative constraints on justice. In other 
words, the PD justificatory process, as it is construed, leaves entirely open the 
possibility that there may be some independent valid reasons to set a limit over the 
conceptions of justice that we are allowed to defend. And PD theorists, indeed, do 
affirm the existence of basic moral principles able to override any constructive in-
terpretation of justice. 
 
In the introductory section I specified that the task of this paper is not to delve 
into the foundations of the PDM. However, something at this point can and must 
be said. There is common agreement among PD theorists around “the principle 
that human beings are of equal, ultimate, and general concern” (Sangiovanni 2008, 
147). That is, the fundamental unit of concern, and the starting assumption, of 
such method are individuals as thought of as possessing equal moral worth. This 
seems at first sight puzzling given that, as we have seen, existing practices are tak-
en to be the starting point for the construction of a theory of justice. However, 
PD theorists would argue that taken by itself the equal moral worth of individuals 
                                                     
19  See Ronzoni (2009). 
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will not say much about the distributive patterns that ought to govern our institu-
tions. An essential part of the justification of principles of distributive justice must 
be played by the values concretely embedded in actual practices. But such a move 
is not conceived as a betrayal of the fundamental moral concern towards persons; 
rather, it is thought of as the best way to honour it.20 
 
How is this PD basic assumption useful for the present analysis? Such fundamen-
tal concern sets precisely — what I formerly called — a negative constraint on 
conceptions of justice. In the PDM, indeed, the moral primacy rests on individuals 
and cannot be overcome or contradicted. Therefore, as Sangiovanni points out, 
“For a conception of justice to get off the ground, there must be some sense in 
which the terms of the institution are at least capable of being justified to all par-
ticipants” (Sangiovanni 2008, 163). This means that in order to justify a conception 
of justice we ought to offer reasons that everyone might find in principle accepta-
ble. What does this say with respect to the PDM's power of criticising current 
practices? According to Sangiovanni, there could be no admissible basis to justify 
state of affairs that are supported exclusively by unmediated coercion. As Sangio-
vanni goes on, “if the institution must depend on systematic and unmediated co-
ercion to reproduce and sustain itself, then the institution is incapable of such a 
justification and must therefore be rejected” (Sangiovanni 2008, 163). The imme-
diate consequence of this is that the mere existence of a set of institutions does not 
authorise the PD theorist to construe a conception of justice on the basis of the 
point and purpose it seems to foster. For a PD theorist there must be some sense 
in which the institution is voluntarily built, valued, and maintained by participants.  
 
3. THE PDM AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN 
EXTENDED ACCOUNT 
 
Up to this point I have mainly reframed the methodological claims that can be 
usually traced in the PD literature. In this last section, I will try to expand this 
common reading by highlighting some of what I believe to be the methodological 
implications of such approach. In particular, I will try to further clarify such meth-
od by bringing attention to two additional theoretical tools — specifically, two 
additional models — the PDM could, and should, use in order to adequately un-
derstand what justice demands. 
 
More precisely, I will argue that the two additional methods of inquiry I will short-
ly introduce ought to be conceived as a necessary part of a PD analysis of justice. 
However, as we will see, these two additional models affect the conceptions of 
justice that will be justified by the PDM only indirectly: this is the main reason why 
these additional theoretical tools prove to be consistent with the PDM fundamen-
                                                     
20 As Valentini explains “[The PDM] is premised on a concern with preserving the distinc-
tive values promoted within particular practices for the sake of individuals themselves.” Valen-
tini (2011, 406). On the same point, see also Banai, Schemmel, and Ronzoni (2011, 50), San-
giovanni (2007, 50), and Sangiovanni (2008, 147-48). 
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tal methodological commitments. I say “indirectly” because the two models do 
not allow PD theorists to draw direct conclusions about the content of a concep-
tion of justice (which is exclusively given by the constructive interpretation above 
illustrated); rather, they allow to critically rethink, and possibly change, the point 
and purpose of our practices, i.e. the foundation of conceptions of justice. 
 
Because these two models enable a critical revision of the foundation of the con-
ceptions of justice, I will conclude that the accuse of a passive acceptance of the 
status quo which might be moved against the PDM results sensibly curtailed. In 
the end, I will explain, political imagination in the PDM takes a peculiar form: the 
political worlds we can meaningfully judge desirable and worth pursuing are given 
by the point and purpose of our practices; however, the point and purpose of our 
practices is not simply a brute fact given by the circumstances and accepted by the 
theorist. In fact, the PD theorist has at her disposal several theoretical tools to as-
sess, criticise and rethink the point and purpose of practices themselves. To show 
that this is the case, I will now deal extensively with these two additional models. 
 
3.1. The role of modelling alternative implementations of principles 
 
The first additional model that should be considered an integral part of a well-
developed PD analysis consists in a representation of one possible instantiation of 
the principles of justice defined through the constructive interpretation. Indeed, I 
want to argue that the possibility that justice might be equally realised by a plurality 
of different social arrangements generates a specific methodological requirement 
on the PDM. As I am going to explain, the opportunity of comparing different, 
though equally just, states of affairs is a theoretical tool not only consistent with 
the PDM, but also demanded of it. Moreover, and more importantly for the pre-
sent discussion, such theoretical exercise, besides being a necessary component of 
a consistent PD analysis, pushes the PDM towards an active examination and cri-
tique of the status quo. Let me explain why it is so. 
 
As I said in the introductory part of the paper, the focus of the present discussion 
is normative political theory and, as I pointed out, when we are interested in norma-
tive theory our main task is typically that of imagining — as clearly as possible — 
the contours of the world we should strive for. Indeed, tracing a sufficiently clear 
image of the world we should aim at looks essential in order to effectively guide 
our actions and to allow us to evaluate, hence validate, that world. However, to 
achieve this goal, the ideal of justice so depicted — the ideally just world — does 
not need to be defined in every detail. In fact, it is plausible to imagine that just 
circumstances could be successfully instantiated by a set of different political ar-
rangements. 
 
To make this idea more concrete, let us consider an example (and notice that the 
case is only meant to be explanatory of the point I am making, a PD analysis 
would certainly be much more complex and detailed than the one here depicted). 
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PD theorists are usually regarded as favouring “statism”, meaning with this that 
they conceive the State as a crucial institution to preserve the point and purpose of 
the practices that are conducted within it.21 In fact, according to PD theorists, 
States make possible the establishment of peculiar relationships between individu-
als, which guarantee the proviso of certain essential goods (Sangiovanni 2007, 25-
27): it is for this reason that, within a PD framework, States are usually judged as 
institutions that ought to be preserved, whereas cosmopolitan views of global poli-
tics represent a failure to understand what justice fundamentally demands. So, as-
suming that the preservation of the State as an institution is a requirement of jus-
tice — as many PD theorists do claim — it might happen that we could fulfil such 
requirement in different ways. How could we tackle, for example, the problem of 
migration? As PD theorists maintain, the value of States consists in making possi-
ble an efficient redistribution of goods in a cooperative setting. It is precisely for 
this reason, so the argument goes, that it is pointless to seek a “global State”: a 
global State would fail to provide the goods we judge valuable in current practices. 
Hence, we could not give citizenship to everyone who asked for it, nor we could 
accept an unlimited amount of migrants within our borders. But then, faced with a 
severe migratory flux towards our State, what could we do? It seems that we could 
answer in different ways, equally responsive to justice: we could close borders, we 
could strive to create better conditions in the migrants' home country, or we could 
set up international institutions with the aim of sharing the burden of migration, 
thereby making it costless for our institutions. 
 
Strictly speaking, selecting one of these three options is a neutral choice from the 
point of view of justice. As I said, we could realise justice in many different ways. 
But there is a crucial point to notice: even though this choice is neutral from the 
point of view of justice (in this overly simplified example), it is by no means cer-
tain that the same choice will be normatively neutral. In fact, normative reasoning 
about politics is certainly not limited to a reflection about justice. As it is often 
noticed, justice is just one political value among others in the sphere of political 
normativity: normative theory should deal with other issues of fundamental politi-
cal concern, such as — just to mention some — legitimacy, liberty, stability, and 
toleration.22 This means that arrangements regarded equally just could be evaluat-
ed differently when examined from the point of view of other political values. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to conduct a further theoretical exercise on the world we 
define as ideally just under present circumstances: we could try to imagine differ-
ent instantiations of the ideally just world and assess their diverse implications. As 
I anticipated, I consider this kind of reasoning as a model-based reasoning con-
sistent with the methodological commitments of the PDM. In fact, we can explain 
the reasoning behind such a comparative task as a theoretical work which needs a 
reference to models in order to be conducted appropriately. As in the case of the 
                                                     
21  See for example Sangiovanni (2007). 
22  For a discussion along these lines, see Rossi and Sleat (2014, 692-94). 
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third step of the constructive interpretation, in order to establish which instantia-
tion of justice we ought to pursue, we would need to figure out with sufficient 
precision how the different instantiations of justice would work and, only in a sec-
ond stage, we could assess which of the alternatives ought to be favoured. Moreo-
ver, this is a theoretical tool accessible to the PDM. In fact, this kind of theoretical 
exercise does entail a comparison solely among those worlds which ideally instan-
tiate the point and purpose of the practices under exam. That is, such a theoretical 
tool does not involve an attempt to reframe the conception of justice with refer-
ence to criteria of desirability other than the one allowed by the PDM. 
 
But why should this theoretical opportunity be relevant for the PDM? Why should 
PD theorists, who are engaged in justifying a conception of justice, be concerned 
with other political values? Indeed, I have just said that PD theorists ought to in-
clude this theoretical tool in their broad project of understanding and defining jus-
tice. To see why such claim is compelling, we must recall some of the fundamental 
characteristics of the PDM. 
 
First of all, we must remember where the PDM takes its defining feature. As I 
have above explained, according to this method conceptions of justice are “prac-
tice-dependent” in the sense that their content is drawn from existing practices — 
or, to be more specific, from the value such practices have from the point of view 
of their participants. This means that the only legitimate way to understand the 
content of justice comes from an appreciation of the participants' reasons for ap-
proving and accepting the practice in question. And this means also that concep-
tions of justice are sensitive to empirical change: once practices come to be re-
vised, the conception of justice will have to be revised too. 
 
Secondly, and crucially, it must be noted that the PDM considers conceptions of 
justice as capable of having a direct effect on our practical world. As I said in the 
introductory section, PD theories are conceived as “normative” theories, i.e. theo-
ries aimed at guiding our actions in actual circumstances by showing us how fully 
just circumstances look like. Moreover, as we have seen, the belief that the values 
individuals endorse actually shape the institutions they come to take part in consti-
tutes a fundamental rationale of the PD approach. In a PD perspective, then, 
normative theory must be regarded as intrinsically practical.  
 
This second feature has some striking consequences for our analysis. Indeed, if we 
combine the two elements just raised (namely, the empirical sensitivity and the 
empirical power of PD theories) we soon realise that the PDM generates what we 
can call an hermeneutic circle: a conception of justice is built upon existing practices 
but, at the same time, it contributes at shaping practical reality, consequently af-
fecting the system of values that will form the future meaning of justice itself. No-
tice that, given such hermeneutic dynamic, the conception of justice will tend to 
replicate itself, corroborating and reinforcing the structure of existing institutions. 
Correspondingly, in case some factors able to impress a change in the conception 
22                                                                                WP-LPF 3/16 • ISSN 2036-1246 
 
 
of justice that applies in actual circumstances did exist, they would be rooted out-
side the scope of justice. But, as it will soon be clear, the diverse political values 
which come into play when justice needs to be applied are precisely the kind of 
elements able to generate an evolutionary process within the conception of justice 
itself. 
 
Let us go back to the concrete example illustrated above. The choice among the 
three options suggested is not neutral with respect to what justice will entail. In-
deed, we have good reasons to think that in case we pursued the third option — 
the creation of an international network of mutual aid — the future scenario may 
gradually push us to reconsider the primacy assigned to states in the global arena, 
given the value we come to assign to these new structures. Consider, for instance, 
an institution such as the EU. As PD theorists commonly recognise, the EU — 
given its point and purpose — triggers duties of justice which might interfere with 
state sovereignty. As Banai, Schemmel and Ronzoni explain,  
“the structural and cohesion funds of the EU, for instance, have the 
explicit aim of reducing inequalities in wealth and opportunities be-
tween different regions of the EU. This is particularly significant be-
cause not only do the funds have a clear comparative and distributive 
aim, but they also do so at the regional level, thus clearly interfering 
with some intra-state affairs of their members” (Banai, Schemmel, 
and Ronzoni 2011, 57). 
Institutional changes like this one, then, might gradually lead us to reconsider our 
conception of the scope and the content of our duties of justice by introducing 
new practices, which bring about new social goods that have to be weighted and 
assessed against the other ones already existing. This means that, even if, within a 
PD framework, justice can only be conceived in relation to the point and purpose 
of actual practices — and so a conception of justice cannot be created “from 
scratch”, PD theorists have the capacity to affect the new forms justice will take 
“from the bottom”, reasoning about the current courses of action we can choose 
from. 
 
At this point, we must consider a third essential feature of the PDM. Above I have 
explained that the PDM finds its fundamental rationale in the belief that a concep-
tion of justice ought to be mutually justifiable, that is to say, mutually acceptable 
by every person subjected to it. And I was careful to point out that the mutual ac-
ceptability PD theorists are talking about is linked with a conception of persons as 
morally equal and ultimate units of moral concern. As we have seen, such a 
ground generated a claim against practices supported by a mere coerced ac-
ceptance. The acceptance which matters for PD purposes is a sincere and free ad-
hesion to the practical values embedded in social practices. The underlying insight 
that moves a PD approach is that the theorist ought not dictate autonomously 
what justice demands; rather the theorist should help to systematise the implicit 
beliefs about justice participants hold and to enhance a critical self-reflection. The 
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conception of justice so construed has authority precisely because it is thought to 
reflect those rules which might gain the approval of those subjected to them. 
 
Now that we have all the necessary elements at our disposal, why must the em-
ployment of this theoretical tool be considered mandatory for PD theorists? I 
started from the observation that the normative issues justice raises remain often 
underdetermined by PD theories: in fact, I have explained that assessing the im-
plementation of justice requires referring to a plurality of values other than the one 
of justice. There is, we could say, a space of normative inquiry about justice which 
a PD conception of justice is not, in itself, sufficient to tackle. But this further 
space of normative inquiry is very relevant in a PD framework. This is due to the 
hermeneutic circle illustrated above: this space of normative inquiry left open can 
instigate a change of the conception of justice itself. And — this is my final point 
— given the PD commitment towards an uncoerced and unbiased acceptance of 
social arrangements, the PD theorist has a special duty to clarify and critically dis-
cuss the diverse possible implementations of justice. By discussing the competing 
available ways of applying justice a PD theorist helps to make possible a well-
formed (because informed and conscious) evolution of the conception of justice 
over time. In the open discussion of competing instantiations of justice a PD the-
orist finds a space from which she can promote a well-formed public debate on 
issues that might — in the future — come to form the basis of those social under-
standing that will compose a conception of justice. And this is an inescapable task 
for a PD theorist given the foundational assumption that conceptions of justice 
ought to mutually justifiable. 
 
3.2. A new role for fictional models 
 
In the concluding remarks of the former section, I underlined that, precisely be-
cause the PDM requires conceptions of justice to be justifiable, the PDM cannot 
offer justification for institutions exercising unmediated coercion against some of 
its participants: for instance, the PDM cannot accept as valid a conception of jus-
tice which justifies slavery, even if slavery is historically accepted within the institu-
tion we are interpreting. In other words, a conception of justice which cannot of-
fer reasons in support for the existence and maintenance of a certain institution, 
except the brute “reason” that that institution has enough power to impose its will 
on some of its participants, cannot be considered a conception of justice at all. For 
this reason, the PDM has the capacity of demanding the abolition of entire institu-
tions. 
 
However, can we limit ourselves to identify and counteract cases of manifest coer-
cion in order to fulfil the justifiability requirement? If disallowing (as invalid) con-
ceptions of justices which merely reflect the prevailing balances of power is a core 
requirement of every justification of justice, we should take particular care in diag-
nosing cases of coercive acceptance. Yet — some might argue — the most rooted 
and subtle forms of coercion are often those which are not as manifest as the case 
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of the institutionalisation of slavery. In fact, some could point out, the most ine-
radicable forms of coercion are precisely the ones so effective as to be hidden be-
hind a veil of acceptance by those who are subjected to its influence. But has the 
PDM the necessary tools to individuate such cases? By letting justice to depend on 
an interpretation of the participants' reasons for acceptance, are not PD theorists 
merely reinforcing current power unbalances? This is a criticism which may well 
be posed by the Critical Theory tradition, and Sangiovanni recognises that such a 
charge could be a powerful argument against the PDM.23 As critical theorists are 
well aware of, the acceptance of a certain institution can be the result of a form of 
“false consciousness”, meaning with that a state of consciousness which “prevents 
the agents in the society from correctly perceiving their true situation and real in-
terests” (Geuss 1981, 3). If false consciousness is a concrete possibility — and PD 
theorists do not deny it — we should better devote our efforts in freeing ourselves 
from the dominant ideology rather than strengthening it attributing normative rel-
evance to the alleged point and purpose of our practices. 
 
Which resources has the PDM to reduce the power of such criticism? As Sangio-
vanni acknowledges, the PDM could welcome the suggestions of critical theorists: 
the two approaches are not to be seen as rivals. In fact, an attentive process of 
social criticism could be required as an additional part of the PDM, precisely as a 
further check on our interpretations. Specifically, in order to offer a coherent and 
unbiased interpretation of the point and purpose of a given practice, the PDM 
could usefully avail itself of tools like the “Critical Theory Test” as suggested by 
Bernard Williams. According to Williams, since a justification cannot be accepted 
“if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive power which is supposedly being 
justified” (Williams 2005, 6), we should try to analyse our interpretations through a 
series of reflexive tests which in their general form sound like: “If [the participants 
of a practice] were to understand properly how they came to hold [a certain] belief, 
would they give it up?” (Williams 2002, 225-32). If the PDM aims at uncovering 
what are the fundamental reasons that push participants to attribute value to a giv-
en practice, tools like the critical theory test seem to constitute a necessary part of 
the interpretive process. However, as Williams (2002, 225-32) himself recognises, 
understanding what is produced by whom is by no means an easy task. Social criti-
cism, precisely because deals with unrecognised and accepted structures of coer-
cion, is a never-ending process of interpretation.24 Many cases will be too contro-
versial to be assessed, or simply too rooted to be recognised. 
 
Hence, I want to suggest the importance of an additional theoretical tool available 
to PD theorists which would further curtail the charge of status quo bias usually 
advanced against the PDM. As we have seen, PD theorists condemn the reference 
                                                     
23  See Sangiovanni (2008, 161-63). About the Critical Theory charge, see Geuss (1981), 
and also Williams (2002, 219-32). 
24  Not least because disagreements in Critical Theory do exist. Sangiovanni indeed points 
out that Williams and Geuss have different opinions on the status of liberal institutions. San-
giovanni (2008, 163). 
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to fictional models when these are employed to vindicate a conception of justice 
for present circumstances. Above, I have argued that controlled variations of ide-
ally just practices represent a crucial resource to allow a critical rethinking of jus-
tice. Here, I want to suggest that also fictional models (other than the idealised PD 
model) might play a role in a PD framework — where, of course, such a function 
cannot be that of deriving a conception of justice, nor that of imagining alternative 
desirable worlds, otherwise we would betray PD commitments. 
 
So, how could the PDM take advantage of fictional models? Earlier in the text I 
defined fictional models as tools for theoretical exploration: the function of unre-
alistic representations is usually the one of clarifying our intuitions by offering a 
new and simplified perspective on the problems we are tackling. Intended in this 
way, as tools that allow us to reason from a perspective unconstrained by the 
complexities of reality, fictional models could contribute to the operation of social 
criticism that seems to be required by the interpretive procedure itself. Imagining 
fictional models could work as a tool to tease our normative intuitions, where de-
vices like the Critical Theory Test are uninformative. In fact, precisely because fic-
tional models push us to reason endorsing a radically different perspective, design-
ing fictions stimulates a critical rethinking of our practices, because it introduces 
new ways of interpreting reality within the schema of thought we are accustomed 
to.25 
Once again, the point gets clearer if we consider an example; and this time, I will 
propose a well-known one: Michel Foucault's Panopticon. To explain my point, I 
will rely to a large extent on the analysis of the Panopticon as a model James John-
son proposes (Johnson 2014, 51-52). Foucault's Panopticon is the representation 
of a prison designed in such a way as to enable a single watchman to check on the 
behaviour of every inmate at any time, without them knowing when they are being 
monitored. In this particular institution, the watchman is not able to observe all 
the inmates at the same time, however the inmates are well aware that they could 
be under surveillance in any moment. This imaginary structure is used by Foucault 
to illustrate how the mechanisms of disciplinary power — by which he means 
“those systems of micro-power that are essentially non egalitarian and asymmet-
rical” which “have the precise role of introducing insuperable asymmetries and 
excluding reciprocities” (Foucault 1979, 222, cited in Johnson 2014, 551) — oper-
ate and sustain themselves. The Panopticon is particularly effective in explaining 
                                                     
25  This idea of fictional model as a tool to tease our intuitions is certainly not an innova-
tive one, though it has not found much space in political theory's debates. The notion itself of 
“fictional model” is widely used in the philosophy of science to describe models which do not 
exhibit a clear connection with real-world circumstances and which, nonetheless, are able to 
tell us something about our world by pushing us towards a reframing of old problems. See, for 
example, Morrison (2009) and Cartwright (2010, 19-31). A significant, though very different, 
parallel might be also found in the field of arts. In avant-garde artistic movements the fiction 
represented by the work of art was precisely intended as a provocative object aimed at teasing 
our intuitions against dominant cultural tendencies. For a classical reference in this direction, 
see Marcuse (1978). 
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disciplinary power because it represents those asymmetrical relations in their pure 
form allowing us to clearly see both their origin and their effects (Johnson 2014, 
551). 
 
Certainly, we can regard this structure as an example of fictional model. The Pan-
opticon is unrealistic in many respects: it differs from actual practices by, for ex-
ample, degree of complexity, size and participants. Foucault himself, tellingly, does 
not conceive the Panopticon as a mere description of how social practices actually 
work. But the Panopticon is not a fiction built according to PD standards: it does 
not “idealise” existing practices. So what is its function? Significantly, Foucault 
admitted that he had “never written anything but fictions”, but that those fictions 
could contribute to generate “truth” (Foucault 1980, 193, cited in Johnson 2014, 
552). The whole point for Foucault is to set up a vivid image of how social prac-
tices could work, even if just in fiction, to both warn us and awake us against the 
possibility that social practices might be structured around disciplinary powers. As 
Johnson clearly states, “he aims, in other words, less to establish that we now in-
habit, or ever have, a fully functional disciplinary society, than to warn us to re-
main vigilant regarding the myriad ways disciplinary mechanisms infiltrate and re-
define social and political relations” (Johnson 2014, 552). 
 
Hence, Foucault uses his fictional model precisely as I intended it here: as a tool to 
offer a new perspective on reality, by providing us with a description of a practice 
much far from ours but that, nonetheless, has the ability to push us to rethink our 
own practices. Fictional models, in other words, help us not to take for granted 
our beliefs about current practices and invite us to endorse a critical perspective 
towards reality. 
 
Conceived in this way, fictional models seem to be consistent with PD and to fully 
serve its cause. Indeed, these models, even if fictional, have not a normative pur-
pose. From fictional models we cannot conclude anything direct about concep-
tions of justice; a PD theorist can only make use of them in order to revive our 
intuitions and encourage a critical assessment of current practical relationships. 
Moreover, as in the case of the models of instantiations of just practices, these 
additional available models are not merely theoretical exercises the PD theorist 
may decide to take advantage of without betraying her fundamental methodologi-
cal commitments. The PDM, I am suggesting, ought to include fictional models as 
a necessary part of its broad reflection about justice: this must be the case precisely 
because fictional models serve the justifiability requirement by enhancing social 
criticism. Seen in this light, attempts to create new narrations of our own practical 
reality by relying on fictional models seems a requirement that every PD theorist 
ought to fulfil. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
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I opened the paper with this question: (a) “In normative political theory, what 
conception of political imagination does the practice-dependent method entail?” I 
explained that such question was motivated by an interest towards the methodo-
logical controversy around the relationship between facts and principles in norma-
tive political theory. In particular, I specified, by answering this question my objec-
tive was to clarify to what extent normative principles result constrained by facts, 
in case we chose to employ a PD methodology. To this aim, I proposed to tackle 
the question (a) by rephrasing it in another form, namely: (a*) “in normative polit-
ical theory, which models should the practice-dependent method employ in order 
to appropriately understand what normative principles apply to us?” This pro-
posed reformulation was meant to facilitate the inquiry into (a) since, I argued, 
models prove to be useful to tools to understand and systematise the relationship 
between facts and principles within theories. 
 
I have dealt with question (a*) in Section 2 and 3, in an attempt to explore which 
models the PDM ought to refer to in order to appropriately understand the re-
quirements of justice. Accordingly, the answers to (a) should also be clearer now. 
What can be said about the border of political imagination of the PDM, given the 
discussion conducted so far? Following what has been said in Sections 2 and 3, I 
want to suggest that the answer we were seeking for to question (a) can be formu-
lated in two much different ways: the first one simply refers to what the construc-
tive interpretation explicitly tells us, the second one takes also into account the 
whole process of construction of a PD theory. The second version of the answer, 
that I am now in a position to provide, proves to be crucial as it allows us to ade-
quately understand the conception of political imagination implied by the PDM. 
 
On the one hand, we can answer question (a) in a quite straightforward way. As 
we have seen, according to the PD approach, the conception of justice has to be 
built upon the point and purpose of existing practices. Following the constructive 
interpretation PD theorists suggest, the political worlds we ought to pursue are 
those that fully accomplish the point and purpose of actual practices. Then, we 
could answer question (a) saying that the border of political imagination is given 
by those worlds which represent ideal embodiments of the point and purpose of 
the practice under scrutiny. If read in this way, this first answer to (a) easily cor-
roborates the status quo bias charge: the PDM seems merely to accept and 
strengthen existing beliefs about justice. 
 
However, now that we have a better knowledge of the theoretical tools a PD theo-
rist ought to employ in order to construe an adequate conception of justice, such 
answer looks a bit too hasty. In fact, saying that PD conceptions of justice are 
built upon the point and purpose of practices does not say much, in itself, about 
how, and to what extent, facts constrain principles within this approach. In order 
to understand how exactly facts constrain principles in the PDM we need some-
thing more: we need to understand how the “brute fact” of the point and purpose 
of practices is conceptualised with the theory. It is by delving into this second is-
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sue that we can appreciate how complex the relationship between facts and prin-
ciples within the PD approach is: such a relationship can hardly be reduced to a 
simple dependence of the theory from the point and purpose of practices. 
 
As we have seen in Sections 2 and 3 the attitude of the PD theorist, far from being 
one of passive acceptance of current practices, must be one of active and continu-
ous critical engagement. The PD theorist — so as to abide by her fundamental 
methodological commitments — needs to refer to a plurality of theoretical tools in 
order to appropriately deal with the factual basis of her normative proposals. As I 
have tried to emphasise, PD theorists, in light of their methodological founda-
tions, need to ascertain the justifiability of the practices we inhabit, to actively 
stimulate an open and public discussion around normative issues outside the scope 
of justice, and to foster an incessant activity of critical scrutiny about our actual 
beliefs. 
 
Accordingly, the resulting picture of the boundaries of political imagination will be 
much more complex than the one depicted at first. The point and purpose of 
practices that will put the basis of a conception of justice will be one that is able to 
pass the justifiability test, that is partly shaped by the reflective activity of the theo-
rist herself, and that is robust against the kinds of examinations proper of critical 
theory. If it is so, the straightforward answer we gave to (a) — namely, that the 
border of political imagination for the PDM is given by the worlds which ideally 
realise the point and purpose of actual practices — hides a complex methodologi-
cal scenario, and should be read carefully. The “fact” that will constrain PD prin-
ciples is indeed the point and purpose of the practice in question, but this “fact” in 
itself is partly shaped and critically assessed by the theorist. Hence, strictly speak-
ing, there is no easily-definable border of political imagination in the PDM: the 
relationship between facts and principles will result from the overlap of the differ-
ent theoretical tools I put forward in the course of this paper. 
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